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The Smartphone as the Incumbent
“Thing” among the Internet of Things

Abstract
The smartphone has been the ubiquitous computing
platform in the past decade. However, emerging
consumer Internet of Things (IoT) technology trends,
such as smartwatches and smart speakers, promise the
establishment of new ubiquitous platforms. We model
two competing horizontally-differentiated platforms
that each offer a smartphone and another smart device.
This market diverges markedly from standard mixed
bundling results when devices from the same vendor
have super-additive utility. We show that the degree of
a smart device’s differentiation (relative to the
smartphone) is the prime factor determining if it is
profitable to deepen integration between a smart device
with the incumbent smartphone platform. We provide
managerial insights for technology strategy.

1. Introduction
Mobile computing in the form of smartphones is a
dominant technological platform today [13]. However,
the Internet of Things (IoT) promises a broad array of
interconnected products ranging from tiny fitness
trackers to smart homes.
The key question that this paper explores in a
rigorous analytical-modeling approach is the following:
How will the emerging trends of wearables (e.g., Apple
Watch, Android Wear, Pebble) and smart-home
appliances (e.g., Amazon Echo, Apple HomePod,
Google Home) impact smartphones and the mobile
computing platform that dominates devices today?
We focus on smartwatches and smart speakers as
contrasting ends of the consumer IoT spectrum. At
present, many vendors have developed smart devices
that depend on an interoperable/compatible smartphone
in order to function. Thus, the smart device functions as
a “hardware app” that is a complement to its compatible
smartphone platform and adds value to that platform
A “single-homing” user – for example a consumer who purchase a
smartwatch – will use only that one watch… at least until she replaces
it with a newer model. A “multi-homing” user – for example a
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through cross-sided network effects: The more apps and
the more devices compatible to a given smartphone
platform, the more valuable the platform itself, which
attracts more users and attracts more apps (and
potentially more compatible devices). In this scenario,
an Apple Watch adds value to the iOS platform and
attracts more users to it. In a competitive setting with
single-homing users,1 the more “successful” the Apple
Watch, the more the Apple ecosystems will benefit, and
the Android ecosystem will suffer.
However, this situation is unlikely to be permanent.
When a smart device becomes independent enough and
developers build applications for them directly, the
next-generation smart device may transform from a
networked complement into a networked substitute.
We formalize the above observations in a
competitive setting of two competing smartphone
platforms [17], each offering complementary smart
devices. We characterize market outcomes in terms of
prices, market-shares, and profits and do sensitivity
analysis examining how various market parameters
affect the market outcomes. We identify various eras of
connected device evolution and examine how nextgeneration connected devices in each era may affect
today’s dominant client-side computing platform, the
smartphone.

2. Background
We discuss related literature on network effects in
platforms and the Internet of Things.

2.1. Network effects in platforms
The paper is related to the broad network effects [10]
and platform economics literatures [3,11,17]. This
literature has been reviewed broadly by Rochet & Tirole
[18]. In addition, Heitkotter et al. [15] argued that twosided markets literature is useful in understanding the
economics of mobile computing and related strategic
smartphone app developer – might decide to sell apps on both
competing smartphone platforms, iOS and Android.
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question. In the rest, we highlight articles from the
closest specific strand: bundling and tying in two-sided
markets.
Research on information goods has shown that
bundling might be an extremely profitable strategy [2,
14, 16]. Moreover, tying (when two or more products or
services are offered only as a bundle and they are not
available individually) can be used as a mechanism for
foreclosing a market [5, 19]. Doganoglu & Wright [9]
analyzed the ability of an incumbent to use introductory
offers to dominate a network market in the face of a
more efficient rival. Amelio & Jullien [1] showed that
firms can use tying to subsidize participation in twosided markets, and that tying increases social welfare
when network effects are strong. Choi [6] showed that
tying induces more consumers to multihome and makes
platform specific exclusive content available to more
consumers, so tying can be welfare enhancing if
multihoming is allowed. Gans [12] proposed antitrust
remedies for tying and found conditions under which
those remedies will be effective in improving social
welfare. Choi & Jeon [7] proposed a leverage theory of
tying in two-sided markets, motivated by antitrust
investigations concerning Google. Carlton & Waldman
[4] analyzed exclusive channel and revenue sharing
strategies in a context of suppliers and retailers. Overall,
most of this literature is concerned about welfare
implications, and related antitrust issues, while our main
focus is strategic interaction and the impact of
technology.

2.2. Internet of Things
The Internet of Things theme has attracted
substantial attention in industry reports and in the
computer science and engineering literature [20].
In general, the concept refers to everyday things that
have processing power, sensor, and actuator
capabilities, and are interconnected with the rest of the
Internet. As an example, as of September 2018, Apple
announced the Series 4 of its Apple Watch with fitness
tracking and other health-oriented capabilities. In the
context of smart homes, Amazon announced a new
series of smart speakers and related devices, including a
smart microwave.
Over time, IoT will be ubiquitous, context-aware
and provide ambient intelligence. Application areas
could include supply chains, manufacturing, agriculture,
energy, healthcare, etc. All these could be thought of as
industrial IoT.
Our research is more close to the consumer IoT,
which includes wearables, smart homes, smart cars and
other related applications geared towards consumer
markets. IoT promises the integration of physical and

digital world and the creation of new value, but it also
entails challenges such as security and privacy.
Overall, while the IoT is considered one of the most
significant contemporary tech trends, there is limited
economics research on the topic. Our research aims to
start filling this gap.

3. Model
We consider a model in which two competing
platform owners each offer a smartphone and a
complementary product. We introduce our model with
smartwatches as the complementary products, and then
discuss smart speakers as a change in model parameters.
Each platform connects app developers with
consumers to create positive cross-side network effects.
Consumers have unit demand for at most one
smartphone and at most one smartwatch (i.e., they
single-home separately for each product), while
developers can multi-home costlessly to make apps for
any combination of the four products in a market. The
network effects are independent for each product.
Consumers have horizontal preferences for products
that we model as uniformly distributed locations in a
Hotelling square such as Figure 1, with the x-axis related
to smartwatches and y-axis related to smartphones, and
misfit disutility arises from the distance “traveled” on
each axis. Developers have design goals that are easier
to realize on some products than others, so we distribute
developers uniformly across a similar Hotelling square.
We discuss correlated misfit costs in Subsection 4.4.

Figure 1: Hotelling square of preferences for
smartphones and smartwatches.
Even with independent network effects and
uncorrelated misfit costs, synergy exists between a
vendor’s products that increases the value to a developer
or consumer. The exogenous parameter measuring this
synergy – s for developers and S for consumers – is a
strictly positive increase to value before price is
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considered. For example, a consumer purchasing both
products from the same vendor receives (1 + S) times
the sum of individual product utilities, less the disutility
associated with prices.
We index a bundle by the watch and phone
purchased (or developed for).  indicates that the
device is not part of the bundle, while A and B represent
the vendors’ offerings. Therefore, {A,A} represents a
bundle of the first vendor’s smartwatch and smartphone,
while {,B} represents purchasing only the second
vendor’s smartphone.
In the following utility and value functions, I is an
indicator function; C refers to consumer, D to developer,
i to watch vendor, j to phone vendor, N to cross-side
network effect, P to price (or phone in subscripts), Q to
quantity/market-share, S to synergy, T to transport/
misfit cost, U to consumer utility, V to developer value,
W in subscripts to watch, x to smartwatch preference,
and y to smartphone preference. For parameters that
affect Consumers and Developers separately, uppercase
(e.g., NW) applies to Consumers, and lowercase (e.g.,
nW) applies to Developers.
𝑢𝑊∅ (𝑥) = 0
𝑢𝑊𝐴 (𝑥) = 𝑢𝑊 + 𝑁𝑊 𝑞𝑊𝐴 − 𝑥 ∙ 𝑇𝑊
𝑢𝑊𝐵 (𝑥) = 𝑢𝑊 + 𝑁𝑊 𝑞𝑊𝐵 − (1 − 𝑥)𝑇𝑊
𝑢𝑃∅ (𝑦) = 0
𝑢𝑃𝐴 (𝑦) = 𝑢𝑃 + 𝑁𝑃 𝑞𝑃𝐴 − 𝑦 ∙ 𝑇𝑃
𝑢𝑃𝐵 (𝑦) = 𝑢𝑃 + 𝑁𝑃 𝑞𝑃𝐵 − (1 − 𝑦)𝑇𝑃
𝑈𝑖,𝑗 (𝑥, 𝑦) = [𝑢𝑊𝑖 (𝑥) + 𝑢𝑃𝑗 (𝑦)] × (1 + 𝐼𝑖=𝑗 ∙ 𝑆) − 𝑃𝑖,𝑗
𝑣𝑊∅ (𝑥) = 0
𝑣𝑊𝐴 (𝑥) = 𝑣𝑊 + 𝑛𝑊 𝑄𝑊𝐴 − 𝑥 ∙ 𝑡𝑊
𝑣𝑊𝐵 (𝑥) = 𝑣𝑊 + 𝑛𝑊 𝑄𝑊𝐵 − (1 − 𝑥)𝑡𝑊
𝑣𝑃∅ (𝑦) = 0
𝑣𝑃𝐴 (𝑦) = 𝑣𝑃 + 𝑛𝑃 𝑄𝑃𝐴 − 𝑦 ∙ 𝑡𝑃
𝑣𝑃𝐵 (𝑦) = 𝑣𝑃 + 𝑛𝑃 𝑄𝐶(𝑃𝐵) − (1 − 𝑦)𝑡𝑃
𝑉𝑖,𝑗 (𝑥, 𝑦) = [𝑣𝑊𝑖 (𝑥) + 𝑣𝑃𝑗 (𝑦)] × (1 + 𝐼𝑖=𝑗 ∙ 𝑠) − 𝑝𝑖,𝑗
All exogenous parameters are strictly positive
except for taste indices, which range over the closed
interval [0,1]. Market shares such as QWA are
endogenously determined and also range over [0,1]. We
employ the common convention that cross-side network
effects are proportional to market share on the other side
of the network.
We introduce bundles in four eras. The first era
represents the market before app-enabled smartwatches.
The second era adds single-vendor bundles wherein a
smartwatch only functions if the consumer also owns

the matching smartphone. The third era improves
smartwatches into stand-alone devices, which also
permits consumers to mix and match between vendors
if desired. Finally, the fourth era adds additional phonelike functions to smartwatches.

4. Results
We present the results of our model in chronological
order across four eras. Formal analytical proofs of our
Lemmas and Propositions are omitted due to space
limitations in the proceedings. For the figures
illustrating market outcomes, we choose model
parameters that ensure that all intersections of interest
occur within the Hotelling square.

4.1. Smartphones only
In the first era (before app-enabled smartwatches or
smart speakers), the only bundles available to
consumers are {,}, {,A} and {,B}.
With symmetric firms, the standard result obtains
that each has a market share of one-half and charges a
price equal to the transport cost tP (Figure 2). That is,
firms compete away the network effect on the consumer
side, which vastly increases the region of the parameter
space that admits full coverage of Consumers.
Note that for symmetric firms, the standard result
obtains that each has a market share of one-half and
charges a price equal to the transport cost tP. See the left
panel of Figure 2. That is, firms compete away the
network effect on the consumer side, which vastly
increases the region of the parameter space that admits
full coverage of Consumers.
Lemma 1: The condition for full market coverage of
smartphone Consumers in the presence of network
effects is 2uP + NP(qPA + qPB) ≥ 3TP, which is a looser
constraint than the standard uP ≥ 3TP without network
effects. Firms charge Consumers TP and Developers
vP/2 + nP/4 when an interior solution obtains, serving a
fraction [vP/2 + nP/4]/tP of Developers. Each firm’s
profit is TP/2 from Consumers plus [(vP/2 + nP/4)2]/tP
from Developers.■
The intuition behind this result is that network
effects are competed away on the Consumer side with
single-homing customers, but not on the multi-homing
Developer side. The free utility from cross-side network
effects makes full coverage on the Consumer side likely.
Firms attract Developers independent of their activity
with the competing firm, so the prices offered to
Developers are those of local monopolists.
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Era 1: Phones Only

Era 2: Phones and Bundles Only

{,B}

Era 3: All Combinations Available

{A,B}
{,B}

{,B}

{B,B}

{B,B}

{A,A}

{,A}

{A,A}
{,A}

{,A}
{B,A}

Figure 2. Consumer market shares across three eras with S = 1/4, TW = 5/8 and TP = 1/2. The
horizontal axis measures taste for watches while the vertical axis measures taste for phones.
Developer market shares are much simpler because firms treat multi-homing developers as if
the other firm does not exist.
We assume an interior solution for Developer
market shares because this implies that some
Developers sell on one platform but not the other, and
this represents the real market for Developers. An
interior solution places two mild constraints on
transport/taste costs:

Consumer market for the older product – rather than bet
on a risky new product being able to saturate the
Consumer market with smartphone/smartwatch
bundles. Given the more varied form factors and less
flexible interface, it follows that misfit costs would be
different in each dimension.

Assumption 1: Developer misfit costs are at least
tP > (vP/2 + nP/4) > 0.■

Assumption 3: Smartwatch tastes are stronger than
smartphone tastes such that TW > TP and tW > tP.■

Assumption 2: Consumer misfit costs are in the range
(2/3×[uP + NP(vP/2 + nP/4)/tP]) ≥ TP > 0.■

Proposition 1: Firms charge Consumers TW for
smartwatches and Developers vW/2 + nW/4 when an
interior solution obtains, serving a fraction
[vW/2 + nW/4]/tW of Developers. Each firm’s profit is
TW/2 from Consumers plus [(vW/2 + nW/4)2]/tW from
Developers.■

4.2. Smartwatches complement smartphones
This era adds bundles {A,A} and {B,B} which have
super-additive utility. Firms will keep the existing
phone prices – which guarantee a fully covered
Era 4: Future device with α = 1/8
{A,B}

Era 4: Future device with α = 1/4

Era 4: Future device with α = 3/8

{,B}
{B,B}

{,B}

{B,B}

{A,B}

{,B}
{A,B}

{B,A}

{B,A}
{A,A}

{A,A}
{,A}

{B,B}

{,A}

{A,A}

{,A}

{B,A}

Figure 3. Consumer market shares with S = 1/4, TW = 5/8 and TP = 1/2 when the future watch device
becomes available over three values of α. The horizontal axis measures taste for pure watches
while the vertical axis measures taste for phones.
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The intuition behind this result is that the superadditive utility (i.e., complementarity) from a bundle
induces Consumers with strong smartphone preferences
or smartwatch preferences to purchase the bundle. If
misfit costs are very low, all Consumers purchase
bundles. Otherwise, some Consumers keep their
original “bundles” of {,A} and {,B}. Although the
market shares have changed shape, indicating platform
switching, each firm still sells smartphones to 50% of
the Consumers and sells smartwatches to some fraction
of its Consumers. We illustrate the impact in the middle
panel of Figure 2. Smartwatches are revenue-enhancing
for both firms.

4.3. Stand-alone smartwatches
This era adds bundles {A,}, {A,B}, {B,} and
{B,A}, for example enhancing the smartwatch with
independent GPS and phone-call ability (e.g., Apple
Watch Series 3). Era 3 allows most of the holdouts in
Era 2 to purchase a smartwatch that meets their tastes,
further improving vendor revenues once the market
reaches equilibrium. The right panel in Figure 2 shows
the market outcome.
Proposition 2: Adding unbundled smartwatches causes
no Consumers to switch smartwatches, but some
Consumers do purchase smartwatches who had not done
so when they were only available in single-vendor
bundles. Some of the Consumers who newly purchase
smartwatches switch smartphones.■

smartwatch without super-additive utility will not cause
any of those Consumers to switch. On the other hand,
Consumers just below the top-left and just above the
bottom-right were only induced to purchase those
phones due to the synergy of bundling with their
preferred smartwatch. For these marginal phone
purchasers, the ability to pick one from A and one from
B allows them to switch back to their preferred phone.

4.4. Phone-like smartwatches
In this era, a future watch with smartphone
functionality becomes its own device with a blending of
the transport costs. Note that the ability to place phone
calls is not in itself a differentiating feature (or even
unique to Era 4… it became available in Era 3). Rather,
we refer to the smartwatch acquiring some of the look
and feel of the firm’s smartphone offering. For a given
fraction α of “phone-ness,” the utility function for firm
A’s future device is:
𝑢𝑊𝐴 (𝑥, 𝑦) =
𝑢𝑊 + 𝑁𝑊 𝑞𝑊𝐴 − √1 − 𝛼 2 ∙ 𝑥 ∙ 𝑇𝑊 − 𝛼 ∙ 𝑦 ∙ 𝑇𝑃
Note that setting α = 0 recreates Era 3, but here we
shall only consider the case of strictly positive α.
Proposition 3: Adding smartphone features to the
smartwatch, such that it causes a blend of misfit costs
across the phone and watch dimensions, decreases
smartwatch sales and firm profit.■

The intuition behind this result is that anyone who
purchased a smartwatch in Era 2 enjoys super-additive
utility from a bundle, and a newly available unbundled
Era 1: Phones Only

Era 2: Phones and Bundles Only

{B,B}

{B,B}

{,B}

{,A}

Era 3: All Combinations Available

{A,A}

{A,A}

Figure 4. Consumer market shares with S = 1/4, TS = 3/8 and TP = 1/2. The horizontal axis measures
taste for speakers while the vertical axis measures taste for phones.
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Era 2: Phones and bundles only

{B,B}

Era 3: All combinations available
{A,B}

Era 4: Future device with α = 3/8

{B,B}

{B,B}
{A,}
{A,}

{B,}
{A,A}

{B,}

{A,A}

{A,A}

{B,A}

Figure 5. Consumer market shares with S = 1/4, TS = 5/8 and TP = 3/4 (violating Assumption 2 as in
Proposition 5). The horizontal axis measures taste speakers while the vertical axis measures
taste for phones.
The intuition behind this result is that the
indifference lines bordering {,A} and {,B} expand
into the neighboring regions as α increases because (1)
the mixed-vendor bundles become less compelling
because the watches gain traits from the disfavored
phone and (2) marginal single-vendor bundle
Consumers suffer a bigger increase in phone-dimension
misfit than their decrease in watch-dimension misfit.
A phone-like watch turns out to be a bad deal for
vendors: The Consumers who mix a smartphone and a
smartwatch from different vendors do so because they
dislike the phone associated with their preferred watch.
Making the watch more like that phone is a case where
adding features actually hurts sales, as shown in Figure
3 wherein the phone-only region grows with higher α.

Consumers, and the market will exhibit less mixedproduct bundling that the smartwatch market.■
The intuition behind this result is that since optimal
prices can cover the Consumer market with smartphonestrength tastes, optimal prices will also cover the
Consumer market for smart speakers once the market
reaches equilibrium. Consumers also find their lesspreferred smart speaker less distasteful than their lesspreferred smartwatch, so single-vendor bundles are
more compelling. See Figure 4 which has the same
parameter values as in Figure 2 except with TS = 3/8.
Interestingly, while the introduction of α in Era 4
cannot possibly increase adoption, it may still be helpful
to firms. The utility function for firm A’s new device is:
𝑢𝑆𝐴 (𝑥, 𝑦) =

4.5. Smart speakers
We consider the market for the less-mobile
complement (smart home appliance, a.k.a. smart
speaker) to be separate from that of the more-mobile
complement (smartwatch) because the two are not
substitutes for one another. The market for smart
speakers is expected to evolve through the same four
eras discussed above for smartphones. The difference is
that as essentially immobile devices controlled
primarily through voice commands, horizontal
differentiation should be weaker than that of
smartphones rather than stronger. The analysis would
also apply to smart security systems, climate controllers,
microwave ovens, etc.
Assumption 4: Smart speaker tastes are weaker than
smartphone tastes such that TS < TP and tS < tP.■
Lemma 2: A complementary product with lower misfit
costs than the smartphone’s will always cover all

𝑢𝑆 + 𝑁𝑆 𝑞𝑆𝐴 − √1 − 𝛼 2 ∙ 𝑥 ∙ 𝑇𝑆 − 𝛼 ∙ 𝑦 ∙ 𝑇𝑃
Proposition 4: Adding smartphone features to the smart
speaker, such that it causes a blend of misfit costs across
the phone and speaker dimensions, weakly decreases
mixed-product bundling.■
The intuition behind this result is that the smart
speaker Consumer market is fully covered under weaker
conditions than Assumption 2, so Consumers are more
properly thought of as considering a phone to go with
their speaker. The more phone-like the speaker
becomes, the more the market shares resemble the
phone-only market shares in Era 1, which increases the
number of Consumers using their preferred smartphone.
However, there is a further consequence of the
phone being a complement to the speaker. Consider a
market in which firms focus on core customers’ tastes
[8] to the extent that the transport/misfit cost increases
beyond the limit in Assumption 2.
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Proposition 5: Maintaining Assumptions 1, 3 and 4 but
violating Assumption 2 leads to a market where some
Consumers purchase a smartphone solely due to its
supper-additive utility with a smart speaker. Consumers
who purchase a single device purchase a smart speaker
and no smartphone.■
The intuition behind this result is that a group of
Consumers with intermediate y indices would prefer an
outside option to the smartphones offered. This outside
option would be the modern version of a feature phone
(including some social media features, but no app
ecosystem). Figure 5 shows that depending on model
parameters, some of these Consumers may purchase a
single-vendor bundle {A,A} or {B,B}, but others may
maximize their utility with the bundles {A,} and
{B,} which have never had positive market share in
any other configuration.
In short, the smart home appliance evolves from a
networked complement to the smartphone into a
networked substitute for it.
Note that violating Assumption 2 means that Lemma
2 may no longer hold, which would lead to a positive
market share for {,} (a Consumer with a feature
phone and no smart home appliance). In either case,
Proposition 4 continues to hold, and adding phone-like
features to the smart speaker reduces mixed-product
bundling.

5. Discussion
We model the evolution of the market for
smartphones and complementary goods in four distinct
eras. Each era is discussed in turn.
In the first era, smartphones exist as stand-alone
products. They exhibit cross-side network effects but
otherwise behave in a manner that is disconnected from
other networked markets. A universe of complementary
goods emerged providing docks, cases, chargers,
vehicle interfaces, and so on, but these goods did not
exhibit the kinds of cross-side network effects that
would significantly affect adoption of one smartphone
over another.
In the second era, firms introduce a new networked
good that might provide minimal functionality on its
own, but only functions fully – and indeed enjoys
complementarity – when paired with a smartphone from
the same vendor. For example, an early generation
Apple Watch was not capable of much without a
constant connection to an iPhone.
The market outcomes for strong-taste items (i.e.,
wearables) and weak-taste items (i.e., smart home
appliances) are somewhat different, but the differences
appear to be more in degree than in kind. Note that our

model predicts that smartwatches are unlikely to achieve
full adoption by consumers, but that smart home
appliances should be expected to eventually.
In the third era, the newer networked good achieves
reasonable stand-alone functionality. An example of an
era 3 device is a smartwatch that does not require pairing
with a smartphone. For the first time, a consumer who
prefers devices from different vendors can expect each
to work properly, although the complementarity
between devices from the same vendor still exists.
At this point, the new networked goods theoretically
pose a substitution threat to the incumbent smartphone
platforms. We show that the threat from wearables like
smartwatches is hypothetical, but the threat from smart
home appliances is plausible given the historical trends
in industries where technical capability grows faster
than consumers’ collective ability to harness that
capability [8]. The newer device becomes good enough
for most consumers, and the incumbent device withers.
In the fourth era, assuming that smart homes don’t
make smartphones obsolete, we posit that vendors
would import the look and feel of their incumbent
platform to their newer non-smartphone devices.
Examples might be adding a large collection of gesture
controls to smartwatch screens, or adding a home screen
style interface to smart speakers.
The impact of phone-like features is quite different
for each class of devices. The devices like smartwatches
and other wearables with strong consumer tastes
increase the utility for core customers but actually
causes defections from the platform on the margins. On
the other hand, devices with weak consumer tastes like
smart speakers benefit from this type of stylistic
integration even if does not improve the functional
complementarity between the smart speaker and the
smartphone.
Firms would be well served to increase the
functional complementarity (“synergy”) between any of
their networked devices (represented by S in the model).
A higher S leads to more consumers preferring a singlevendor bundle, increasing utility for core and marginal
consumers alike.
Firms should be cautious about increasing the taste
compatibility (“homogenizing the look and feel”)
between smartphones and devices that have stronger
consumer tastes (represented by α in the model). We
expect that wearables will follow a path toward high
differentiation while smart home appliances will follow
a path toward modest differentiation, but it is
conceivable that either or both predictions may prove
inaccurate.
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6. Conclusion
The conventional wisdom in economics and strategy
that any two products are either complements or
substitutes. In this research centered in technology
markets, we identified cases in which a device, such as
a smart home appliance, is a networked complement
initially, but as its capabilities evolve over time, it may
become a networked substitute to today’s dominant
computing platform, the smartphone. We identify and
characterize four eras to capture this evolution of smart
devices.
The second contribution of this research is that we
characterize two very different emerging tech trends
(wearables and smart speakers) in one parsimonious
analytical framework.
Our third contribution is an economic model of the
Internet of Things (IoT). As we discussed in the
background, there is an extensive literature on the
technical aspects of IoT, but very little understanding of
the economics of IoT. We hope that this will become a
growing area of research in information systems and
related fields.
The fourth contribution of this work is that we
analyzed the strategic impact of emerging tech trends
such as wearables (smartwatches) and AI-enabled
connected devices (e.g., smart speakers) on mobile
computing (smartphones). As technology and other
companies position themselves for the future waves of
emerging tech innovations, our analysis provides
managers with important actionable strategic insights:
First, the current generation of smartwatches drives
sales primarily through complementarity with
smartphones, but not all consumers find this
combination compelling. For example, someone may
prefer the iPhone to an Android phone, yet
simultaneously prefer an Android Wear watch to the
Apple Watch. Tying smartwatches to smartphones in
this way therefore generates some deadweight loss.
Stand-alone smartwatches hold the promise of serving
many of these consumers.
Second, note that the ability of a smartwatch to make
phone calls is not dangerous because making phone
calls is a hygiene factor on a smartphone rather than a
differentiating one.
Third, technology vendors would do well to increase
the complementarity between their phones and watches,
but the two products should remain distinct.
Fourth, on the other hand, vendors for generalpurpose smart home appliances like smart speakers do
not face a similar penalty for importing smartphone
features. In fact, the logical end-point is for full
integration with smartphones. There is one caveat
however: a household may contain members who prefer
different smartphones.

The future looks very interesting for the consumers,
developers, and vendors of computing platforms. Our
examination of the relationship between wearables,
mobile computing, and smart homes shows that these
relationships are not static. In particular, if smart
appliances become common in homes, vehicles, places
of business, etc. then the smartphone – today’s essential
must-have device – may find itself suddenly redundant.
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